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The Supreme Court, Justinian, and Antonin Scalia*:
Twenty Years in Retrospect
Paul R. Baier**
I. COLUMBUS DAY, 1986, ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN JUSTINIAN
SOCIETY OF JURISTS
Judge Durante, Justice Calogero, Judge Marullo, Your Honors,
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Years ago my quest for treasure among used books turned up
Piero Calamandrei's Eulogy of Judges. You may know
Calamandrei was an Italian lawyer and a teacher of civil
procedure. His Eulogy of Judges is a psalm book of uncommon
legal prayer, from which I should like to read two verses. Take
these words as my heartfelt greeting to the judges of the American
Justinian Society of Jurists. You honor New Orleans and
Louisiana by your presence.
Calamandrei's words, of course, were directed to his native
Italian judges; I borrow them in welcoming this country's Italian-
American jurists to Louisiana:
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Address Before the American Justinian Society of Jurists, Columbus
Day, 1986, Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, Div. D., Frank A. Marullo,
J., New Orleans.
The Board of Editors of the Louisiana Law Review is pleased to publish
Professor Baier's Columbus Day, 1986, address to the American Justinian
Society of Jurists-the same year Justice Antonin Scalia took his seat on the
Supreme Court of the United States. The speech appears here without the
distraction of footnotes, thus saving its original rhetorical flavor. As a
postscript, Professor Baier looks back twenty years and tells us how things have
fared since, footnotes and all.
** George M. Armstrong, Jr., Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law
Center, Louisiana State University. Member of the Louisiana Bar. Judicial
Fellow, Supreme Court of the United States, 1975-76; Scholar in Residence,
Louisiana Bar Foundation, 1990-92; Distinguished Professor 2004, Louisiana
Bar Foundation. Editor, Mr. Justice and Mrs. Black: The Memoirs of Hugo L.
Black and Elizabeth Black, with a Foreword by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
(Random House, 1986).
I wish to express thanks to my colleague Viceng Feliii, Foreign,
Comparative, and International Law Librarian, Paul M. Hebert Law Center,
Louisiana State University, for his help with the books, for his knowledge of
Sicilian geography, and for his abiding friendship. Grazie, carissimo amico.
And to mon cher collogue Olivier Mordteau, Director of our Center of Civil Law
Studies, Hebert Law Center, for his intellectual companionship apropos Gdny
and La vie apr~s le texte.
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I cannot meet abstract law on the path I take as a man
among men in society.., but many times do I find you, 0
Judge, the corporeal evidence of the law, on whom depends
the fate of my worldly goods.. . . When I meet you on the
road and bow to you with reverence, there is a sweetness of
fraternal gratitude in my greeting. I know you are the
keeper and guardian of those things I hold most dear; in
you I greet the peace of my hearth, my honor, and my
liberty.
Now to my topic: "The Supreme Court, Justinian, and Antonin
Scalia."
It struck me that Your Honors might be curious about our civil
law in Louisiana, about its origins in the recesses of Roman law,
and about your Society's namesake Justinian. I know the Supreme
Court well enough to venture a few words about it in public. As
for Antonin Scalia, he has been on all our minds of late.
First, a few words about Bowers v. Hardwick, the recent
Supreme Court opinion sustaining Georgia's sodomy statute.
Those of you who follow the Court know that last July, the
month in which America celebrated the centennial of the Statue of
Liberty, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of
Georgia's sodomy law. The vote was close, 5 to 4, much closer, I
suspect, than most prognosticators would have guessed.
Chief Justice Burger's special concurring opinion in the
Georgia sodomy case cites the Digest of Justinian and Code of the
Emperor Theodosius in support of Georgia's sodomy law. The
Digest, you will recall, was the centerpiece of Justinian's temple of
the law, the Corpus Jurus Civilis, which was completed well over
a thousand years ago, through the labor of Tribonian and a
battalion of jurists, in 534 anno domini.
Citing the Digest is a rare thing for a Supreme Court opinion,
although not unprecedented. One may naturally wonder whether
Justinian is a proper source of contemporary American
constitutional law.
I tell you these things by way of an introduction to my remarks.
I want to talk to you about two subjects that fascinate me as a law
teacher in Louisiana. One is the law of the Corpus Jurus Civilis,
represented by the figure of Justinian. The other is the law of the
American Constitution, represented by the figure of Antonin
Scalia.
These two figures came face to face one week ago today, in the
Supreme Court building, when Justice Scalia took his judicial oath
of office. Doubtless it was a silent encounter. Some of you may
know that Justinian is one of the great law-givers frozen in marble
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on the north wall of the courtroom. I am sure Justinian never
entered Justice Scalia's mind, which was probably focused on his
new responsibilities, the highest that can weigh on an American
judge.
My speech is divided into two parts. First, I want to take you
on a horse and buggy tour of the Roman Quarter of Louisiana's
legal system. Second, I will assess two of Antonin Scalia's
judicial opinions, written on the District of Columbia Circuit,
against Senator Pastore's measure of expected performance from
Italian American judges. Said the Senator: "The Italian American
judge to be considered equal must be twice as good as the next
judge." Justice Scalia, you will hear me affirm, will prove a
surpassing Supreme Court Justice. The marks are already there, in
the federal reports. Along the way, I hope to show that the law of
the Corpus Juris and the law of the American Constitution are at
once both strikingly different and remarkably the same.
I
Now, I assume you know we have a Civil Code; Louisiana is
what we call a "civilian jurisdiction." This much about us was
circulated pretty widely by Stanley Kowalski in Tennessee
Williams's A Streetcar Named Desire. You may remember
Stanley exclaiming to Blanche: "There is such a thing in this State
of Louisiana as the Napoleonic Code, according to which whatever
belongs to my wife is also mine, and vice versa." Blanche
responded: "My, but you have an impressive judicial air!"
But beyond Stanley Kowalski, Louisiana law is a mystery to
most outsiders, who are scared off by it. Consider, if you will, one
of my favorite civilian noises, the "antichresis." Now here is a
word that sounds frightening enough. Rest assured, however, that
the antichresis is only a pledge of real property---"immovables" we
say here--to secure a loan. I won't bother you with the details,
which you can find in our Code. But I will ask you to smile at the
plight of Edward Livingston's lawyer, in the old case of Livingston
v. Story, which required the lawyer to unravel Louisiana's law at
the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court at
that time was headed by Chief Justice Taney, from Maryland,
whom I suspect knew nothing about the antichresis, which was the
focal point of the case. This was 1837, and Livingston's lawyer
started out by telling the Justices that, "The code of law prevailing
in Louisiana, is difficult to be understood."
But the lawyer continued on, made his point, and won his case.
His synopsis of early Louisiana law is worth quoting to Your
Honors; it is our first stop on our tour of Louisiana's legal
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landscape: "The code of law prevailing in Louisiana," explained
the lawyer,
has grown up since the first establishment of the province.
Originally it was adopted by a proclamation of Governor
O'Riley [sic], in 1768; and was afterwards confirmed by
the King of Spain. This was the "Corpus Juris Civilis," and
the "Partidas," and the "Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias." The French inhabitants of the province became
dissatisfied, and "Les Coutumes de Paris" were declared to
furnish the rules of practice; the principles of the
established laws to remain in full force.
This was the state of things, when the United States
acquired the territory, and great embarrassments arose on
the introduction of the provisions of the laws of the United
States, and the forms of proceedings under the same. A
code was prepared by authority of the Legislature of the
State, which is called the civil code [of 1825], and is in
most of its provisions the Code Napoleon; and allows the
Spanish laws to prevail in all cases to which they will
apply.
That, in a lawyer's nutshell, is the story of our early Louisiana
law as recorded in the United States Reports.
The Civil Code of 1870 followed. It has been the private law
of this state ever since, although there have been plenty of
amendments and a large body of statutory law has swelled up
outside the Code.
If you will allow me a personal note, may I say I knew nothing
of Louisiana's civil law when I arrived at LSU some fifteen years
ago. I can tell you from painful experience that passing the
Louisiana bar examination is a trying affair for a common law
lawyer, such as I was. I regard my membership in the Bar of
Louisiana as one of my proudest boasts. I owe my learning to my
civilian colleagues, including Dean Paul M. Hebert, who let me
teach the Louisiana Civil Law System course; to Athanassios
Yiannopoulos, whose Greek spirit is lineal to Papinius, Ulpian, and
Paulus--Roman jurists of exquisite learning; to Safil Litvinoff,
whose genius is exceeded only by his wit; and to Robert Pascal,
who in the style of Gaius molded his students into priests of the
law.
Next, let me take you back two thousand years to Rome, to the
Forum, for a quick glance at the bronze tablets of the Twelve
Tables; thence to the Golden Age of classical jurists, whose
memory this Society honors by its name and by its membership.
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Now, I will only bother you with the first of the Twelve Tables.
We are far back in the recesses of time. This is 450 B.C. I have no
earthly idea what a walk in the street was like, but it does seem to
me remarkable that the first recorded Roman law pertains not to,
say, the rights of the father as pater familias, but to--of all
things--"concerning the summons to court." I quote the Scott
translation: "When anyone summons another before the tribunal of
a judge, the latter must, without hesitation, immediately appear."
As I recall my civil procedure, this is good law today, with the
exception that under the federal rules we allow a defendant twenty
days to answer the summons and complaint.
S.P. Scott says that the proverbial "law's delay" was not known
to the ancient Romans. When the case came to trial, always in the
morning, the parties themselves argued it, and the judge was
compelled to render a decision before sunset of the same day, in
accordance with Law X of the First Table, to wit: "The setting of
the sun shall be the extreme limit of time within which a judge
must render his decision."
The genius of the Romans was eminently practical. Therefore,
procedural rules precede substance in the bronze expression of
Roman law. The first talk is of the summons and of the tribunal of
the judge. Remedies define rights. You see the same thing in the
development of the forms of action at common law.
The Twelve Tables, let me add, sparked the idea that the law
should be written down where people can read it, thus enabling
every citizen to become acquainted with the laws of his country
and to apply to judicial tribunals to redress wrongs. A Frenchman
today is proud of his Code, as Napoleon was proud of it in 1804,
because he can carry it in his pocket and look up the law.
As to the Golden Age, roughly between 100 and 300 A.D., this
was a period of high flowering in the fields of the law. It saw an
outpouring of over 2,000 books of 3,000,000 lines by remarkable
jurists, statesmen learned in the law who, for no remuneration,
undertook to interpret the law for others as their contribution to
public life.
The Golden Age was the period of Papinian, Paulus, Ulpianus,
and Modestinus, vested by the Emperor with the "Ius
respondendi," the right of giving written opinions under seal,
binding on the parties to the case, in respect of which the opinion
was delivered. These jurists were the real builders of the temple of
Roman law. They were to Roman law what the common law,
derived from actual cases, is to English law. The jurists recorded
their cases of interest and their points of disagreement, and it is this
record, both theoretical and derived from practice, which has come
down to us in the Digest of Justinian.
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The Golden Age was the period of "Gaius Noster"-"Our
Gaius," as his students affectionately called him-Rome's premier
law teacher and author of the Institutes, a truly civilized legal study
guide for aspiring law students.
This was the period of the Roman praetor, the chief magistrate,
and of the Ius Praetorium, predecessor of English equity. Through
his power over procedure and remedies, the Roman praetor was the
first to temper the letter of the law with the quality of mercy.
Let me give you a brief sampling of the legacy of Rome's
jurists. I have in mind a few quick comparisons and contrasts
between Rome's Corpus Juris and America's Constitution.
Papinian says: "No one can change his mind to the injury of
another." And it was given at Constantinople, by the Emperor
Valentinian, that: "It is certain that the laws and constitutions
regulate future matters, and have no reference to such as are past."
High authority suggests that the quoted maxim of Papinian, which
Bracton lifted whole into English law without attribution to Rome,
is the origin of the ex post facto prohibition and the rule against
impairing the obligation of contracts found in Article I, Section 10
of the United States Constitution. True, a Roman Emperor, if he
pushed his power, could trample vested rights with impunity. But
as New York's Chancellor Kent observed years ago: "No correct
civilian, and especially no proud admirer of the ancient republic (if
any such then existed), could have reflected on this interference
with private rights, and pending suits, without disgust and
indignation."
Who would have thought that certain of our constitutional
protections have come down to us from Rome?
Ulpianus says: "The governor should not permit the same
person to be again accused of crime of which he has been
acquitted." Is this not the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause? Of this extract in the Digest, Mr. Justice Black has
written: "Fear and abhorrence of governmental power to try people
twice for the same conduct is one of the oldest ideas found in
western civilization. Its roots run deep into Greek and Roman
times." At this point in his judicial opinion, Justice Black cited the
Digest of Justinian.
And the greatest Chief Justice of them all, John Marshall, cited
Justinian in Cohens v. Virginia on the lesser question, "What is a
suit?" Said the great Chief Justice, "We understand it to be the
prosecution, or pursuit, of some claim, demand, or request .... Or
as Bracton and Fleta express it, in the words of Justinian, 'jus pro
sequendi in judicio quod alicui debetur."'
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Citing Justinian as a source of the law of the Constitution is
thus not unprecedented. But this is dangerous if care is not taken
to distinguish dead letter law from living principles of justice.
For example, while it is true that the Digest and the Theodosian
Code punish sodomy, as Chief Justice Burger recently noted,
careful scrutiny of Clyde Pharr's translation and notes teaches us
that: "Sodomy was common during the later Roman Republic and
the entire period of the Empire." It seems the Romans were more
liberal than the Chief Justice would have us believe.
I mean no disrespect of Chief Justice Burger. I mean only to
point out that the law of the Roman Forum need not be our law.
Paulus laid it down that: "The authors of sedition and tumult,
or those who stir up the people, shall, according to their rank,
either be crucified, thrown to wild beasts, or deported to an island."
This hardly comports with our tradition of freedom of speech and
of the press.
There are other stark contrasts. We are told that: "Liberty is
the natural power of doing whatever anyone wishes to do unless he
is prevented in some way, by force or by law." There is no
provision, however, in Roman law for judicial control of the
Emperor's sword or of his decree. Indeed, "The Emperor is free
from the operation of the law," says Ulpianus. And the Emperor
Constantine laid it down in 316 A.D. that: "It is part of our duty,
and it is lawful for us alone to interpret questions involving equity
and law."
This is not our constitutional way. To quote Chief Justice John
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison: "It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."
I turn to Justinian the man. We remember him by his code of
laws and by his majestic church, Sancta Sophia, at Constantinople.
But who was this fellow Flavius Petrus Sabbatius Justinianus?
The mist of fourteen centuries blurs our vision. But we do
have his portrait, and that of his wife, Theodora, set in the mosaic
of St. Vitale in Ravenna, Italy. "There they stand apart but in
balance, emperor and empress, flanked by their courts, making
similar offerings to God."
It is a fact that Justinian started out a Macedonian peasant.
Theodora was born a bear keeper's daughter. "They say this imp
of the circus was the first feminist of the modem world." There
was a lifelong passion between Justinian and Theodora, his
"sweetest charmer," as he called her. "None other than Theodora
could have inspired the famous pronouncement of Justinian on
adultery: 'We have set up magistrates to punish robbers and
thieves; are we not even more straitly bound to prosecute the
robbers of honor and the thieves of chastity?"'
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Justinian had limitless energy. He was known as "the Emperor
who never sleeps." Theodora had limitless ambition. Both of
them died wrapped in the royal purple of Rome, the ultimate
triumph of ultimate ambition and dumb good luck.
Justinian was Roman to the bone. "It was his boast that Latin
was his native tongue." His respect for Roman law was profound.
"There is nothing to be found in all things so worthy of attention as
the authority of the law," he said, and so Justinian set out to
preserve its ancient treasures in the permanent form of the Digest,
five books of extracts which reduced the vast learning of the jurists
to manageable proportions, in one big book the people could read,
"the secular Bible of Christendom."
Add the Codex, which collected imperial decrees, and the
Institutes, general principles of the law aimed at students, and you
have Justinian's great gift to Western civilization, the Corpus Juris
Civilis, a "most holy temple of justice," said Justinian, completed
after seven years labor, from 528 to 534 A.D. "We decree that all
these rules shall be observed in every age by all professors,
students of law, and copyists, and by the judges themselves."
Rumor circulates that Justinian was "The Demon Emperor"
and Theodora, whose character has been debated for fourteen
centuries, was-say it softly---"The Harlot Empress." Scott in his
preface to his translation of the Corpus Juris says some pretty
nasty things about Justinian, whose character, Scott says, "was
defiled by the practice of the most odious vices. He was cruel,
tyrannical, treacherous, unprincipled, and corrupt." But these are
mere general allegations, the sort of character assassination
politicians of every age are used to; Mr. Scott provides no facts to
back them up.
Procopius, who was Justinian's official court historian-
"Boswell of the Byzantines"--paints a lurid picture of behind-the-
scenes happenings in his Secret Anecdota, a book he kept well
hidden from the eyesight of Theodora and her Emperor. But from
what scholars tell us, it's difficult at this distance to separate
Procopian fact from Procopian fiction. I find it hard to believe the
Procopian legend of Justinian-and here I quote the legend,
"pacing the corridors--with or without his head-listening to no
voice but that of a spectral companion." I have read Justinian's
prefaces to his Corpus Juris. They are not the work of a man who
has lost his head.
In short, Justinian remains a paradox. Two portraits have
descended to us--one the Demon Emperor of Procopius. Another
of that great and august man, something of whose wisdom and
large-mindedness is traditionally enshrined in the very name
"Justinian." But they were one and the same man.
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Our tour must move on. Requiescat in pace Justinianus.
II
We reach our last subject, Antonin Scalia, first American of
Italian blood to reach the Supreme Court. I predict he will make
this Society, of which he is a member, proud.
I assume you know his basic background from newspapers of
late. He was born in Queens, New York, fifty years ago, of Italian
immigrant parents. He is a Catholic with a court of nine children.
He has black bushy eyebrows that furrow up when he's
concentrating, and I'm told he's instantly likeable. The pictures
I've seen always show him with a smile, which is a good thing in a
Supreme Court Justice. I heard him say on TV, during the White
House press conference, that luck is involved in being selected
over the next fellow. His credentials are good. He graduated from
Harvard Law School, where he was Note Editor of the Harvard
Law Review. He has a penchant for debate. From the opinions
I've read, I can affirm he is a hard-nosed warrior who enjoys a
good intellectual fight. "Scalia comes across as a knife-fighter, but
a friendly knife-fighter," says a lawyer who has argued before him
in court.
People who know Scalia say he has been a vociferous,
argumentative, and persuasive conservative all his life-a "live
wire on the D.C. Circuit," which he joined in the fall of 1982 on
President Reagan's nomination.
Now, let me recall to your minds Senator Pastore's measure of
expected performance from Italian American judges: "The Italian
American judge to be considered equal must be twice as good as
the next judge."
Our first test case-I promised you two-involves the question
whether lethal drugs used to execute condemned killers must first
be certified as safe and effective by the Federal Food and Drug
Administration. Believe it or not, this was the holding of a
majority opinion written by the D.C. Circuit's liberal icon, Judge J.
Skelly Wright. Judge Scalia's dissent is devastating: "The
condemned prisoner executed by injection is no more the
'consumer' of the drug than is the prisoner executed by firing
squad a consumer of the bullets," shot back Judge Scalia. The
Supreme Court promptly granted certiorari and reversed, nine to
nothing. Justice Rehnquist wrote the Court's opinion; it reverses
on Judge Scalia's rationale and uses the same language in rejecting
the "implausible result" below. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who will
speak first at the conference, and Justice Scalia, who will speak
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last as the junior justice, will get along just fine. Both are men of
large intellectual capacity, like the jurists of old.
At Rome, there were schools of juristic thought, just as there
are in Washington. The Sabinians, founded by Capito, were firm
adherents of the empire, "inclined to follow tradition and to rest
upon authority." The Proculians, on the other hand, founded by
Labeo, were republicans "of independent mind and prone to
innovation." I see Chief Justice Rehnquist as a good Sabinian,
Justice Brennan a good Proculian.
There are those who subscribe to restraint in the exercise of
judicial power, others who would allow judges a freer hand.
This judicial division is two thousand years old. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia belong to the same school of restraint.
This is not my school, but I cannot say theirs is an illegitimate way
of judging. To quote Holmes, who also subscribed to judicial
restraint, "I'm not God."
Our next case is a fantastic one. It is about as good an example
of competing views regarding the proper scope of judicial review
of executive action as one can find. The United States Defense
Department decided to establish a military training center in
Honduras at which American military specialists would train
Salvadoran soldiers. The case obviously has foreign policy
implications. The trouble was that the Secretary of Defense put his
training center smack in the middle of plaintiff Ramirez's private
property. About one hundred Green Berets and 1,000 other
soldiers, including Honduran troops, swarmed all over Ramirez's
property, set up a tent camp, ammunition storage areas, and a firing
range; prime grazing land and fences were bull dozed; cattle were
shot by stray bullets.
Ramirez, a United States citizen, filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. He alleged that his
private property, valued at about thirteen million dollars, had been
seized and damaged wholly without statutory or constitutional
authority and that he had been deprived of property without due
process of law. Plaintiff prayed for an injunction against the
Secretary of Defense, a declaratory judgment, and such other relief
as the court deemed just and proper.
Judge Scalia, writing for the majority, affirmed the dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint. "The fact is that in enjoining a United States
military operation of this sort we have no idea what harm we may
be doing," said Judge Scalia. "And the fact that the supervision
would relate to an ongoing military operation adds separation of
powers concerns to the factors weighing against injunctive relief,"
he added. Ramirez was not remediless: he could bring an action
for money damages for an unconstitutional taking in the Claims
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Court. The closing part of Judge Scalia's majority opinion speaks
loudly of his habit ofjudicial abstinence. I quote from his opinion:
The dissent invokes "the great tradition of judicial
protection of individual rights against unconstitutional
governmental activities" . . . . But that tradition has not
come to us from La Mancha, and does not impel us to right
the unrightable wrong by thrusting the sharpest of our
judicial lances heedlessly and in perilous directions. It
acknowledges the need to craft judicial protection in such
fashion as to preserve the proper functions of government
.... [The dissent's] vision of judicial supremacy.., does
not comport with our understanding of the separation of
powers. It is a vision that obscures not merely the
common-law tradition that injunction is an extraordinary
remedy, but also the political truth that society has many
other needs that must be accommodated with proper
protection of individual rights, and the related
constitutional reality that we serve beside the officers of
two other coequal branches, whose responsibilities, no less
important than our own, require knowledge and judgment
we do not possess.
Scalia concludes:
If the traditional and hence limited relief we have found
available in this case, based upon a more modest
conception of our abilities and powers, lends itself less to
stirring eulogy of the judicial role in vindicating individual
liberties, we are consoled by the fact that it lends itself
more to the preservation of the Constitution.
On rehearing en banc, the full D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
disagreed with Judge Scalia's narrow view of the judicial function.
Said Judge Wilkey for the en banc majority:
The Judiciary is fully empowered to vindicate individual
rights overridden by specific, unconstitutional military
actions. Charges that United States officials are
unconstitutionally housing over 1,000 soldiers on a United
States citizen's private ranch and running military forays
throughout the pastures cannot conscionably be dismissed
by this court at the stage of a bare complaint and supporting
declarations. We emphatically reject the proposition that
the federal courts are closed to these United States
plaintiffs from the start.
Judge Scalia, dissenting on rehearing en banc, retorts:
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Whereas John Marshall was prepared to issue a writ against
the Secretary of State despite the latter's high public office
... this court is especially willing to enjoin the Secretary of
Defense because of that status. To a court imbued with
such a philosophy, it is small wonder that concepts such as
equitable restraint on the basis of interference with military
and foreign affairs, and the act of state doctrine, have little
meaning. Marshall was right and the majority wrong. I
dissent.
This debate over how judges should exercise their power is
ageless.
In bringing my speech to a close, I want to recur to the law of
Rome one last time. In one crucial respect, the workways and
habits of mind of Rome's jurists are the golden treasure of the
Corpus Juris. Exposure to it is a good thing for America's judges,
swamped as they are in the facts of a thousand cases each.
I'm talking here about the duty of the judge. How should Your
Honors judge the conflicts that come before you?
Justinian's Institutes speak of the duty of a judge this way: "A
judge ought to be careful not to decide in any other way than
prescribed by the laws, the constitutions or the customs." I'm sure
you have heard this admonition before, but I doubt you knew its
Roman ancestry. Justinian, in his preface to his Digest says, "We
entertain so much reverence for antiquity that we cannot suffer the
names of these learned jurists to be consigned to oblivion."
Justinian's purpose in collecting the extracts of the jurists was to
prevent judicial caprice, to avoid, in his own words, "cases [being]
disposed of rather according to the will of the judge than by the
authority of the law."
Here, Your Honors, is the birthright of Antonin Scalia: the idea
of judicial restraint from the lips of Justinian himself.
But judicial restraint is not the sole measure of judicial duty as
conceived in the Digest. Ulpianus tells us: "The law obtains its
name from justice; for (as Celsus elegantly says), law is the art of
knowing what is good and just." A second birthright, according to
Justinian's Digest, makes Your Honors "priests of this art, for we
cultivate justice aiming (if I am not mistaken) at a true, and not a
pretended philosophy."
And more: "Justice is the constant and perpetual desire to give
to every one that to which he is entitled," says Ulpianus.
I realize that this general principle will not decide concrete
cases. How Justice Scalia will vote on the agonizing affirmative
action cases before the Supreme Court this Term remains to be
seen. But general principles are not worthless either. They set
500 [Vol. 67
JUSTINIAN AND SCALIA
direction; they may inspire a philosophy of judgment. In the words
of the Chief Justice of the United States who outlawed segregation
in public schools:
In all times and places man has had a sense of justice and a
desire for justice. Any child expresses this fact of nature
with his first judgment that this or that "isn't fair." A legal
system is simply a mature and sophisticated attempt, never
perfected but always capable of improvement, to
institutionalize this sense of justice and to free men from
the terror and unpredictability of arbitrary force.
There are those who hate the name Earl Warren. Some say he
was too much a praetor and too little a judge. But can there be any
doubt that segregation in the schools or apartheid in South Africa
today is unjust?
I realize the Romans exploited slavery, and it is a fact that the
Dred Scott case cites the Institutes of Justinian in support of the
legal degradation of human beings. But I rejoice in the fact of the
Fourteenth Amendment and in judges unrestrained in their quest to
guarantee due process, equal protection, and a full measure of
liberty for Americans.
The jurists of ancient Rome sought to cultivate justice openly
and unashamedly. I pray Your Honors of the American Justinian
Society of Jurists will pursue this same sacred trust, with renewed
enthusiasm, when you return home to your judicial hearths.
Members of the American Justinian Society of Jurists:
I deeply appreciate the honor of your company on this
Columbus Day, 1986. In the years ahead, I predict you will take
great pride in the judgments of II Giudice, Antonin Scalia,
rendered in the Supreme Court, in the shadow of Justinian.
I close with a final verse from Eulogy of Judges:
The judge who becomes accustomed to rendering justice is
like the priest who becomes accustomed to saying mass.
Fortunate indeed is that country priest who, approaching
the altar with senile step, feels the same sacred turbulation
in his breast which he felt as a young priest at his first
mass. And happy is that magistrate who even unto the day
of his retirement experiences the same religious exaltation
in rendering judgment which made him tremble fifty years
before, when as a young praetor he handed down his first
decision.
Thank you, my dear friends, colleagues, and judges. Grazie,
carissimi amici, colleghi, e giudici.
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II. SCALIA-TWENTY YEARS IN RETROSPECT
Nor let the sea surpass his bounds.'
And what of Antonin Scalia after twenty years? To my mind,
Justice Scalia appears as Il Giudice Sapiente. I taught with him in
Siena, Italy. The rubric certainly fits his teaching. The nuances of
the meaning of "sapient"-present participle of the Latin "sapere,"
to have taste or flavor; wise; full of knowledge; discerning: often
ironical2--assuredly fit the first Roman on the Court.
I have no doubt that Justice Scalia falls into the third of
Holmes's tripartite division of legal minds: "kitchen knives, razors,
stings." Holmes, if I may say so, would give Scalia high marks for
his Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Lecture at Harvard, The Rule of
Law as a Law of Rules.3 And in the tradition of Story and
Frankfurter, fellow Harvard professors of law on the Supreme
Bench, Justice Scalia is a voluble talker. I recall a Student's
account of Joseph Story's teaching at Harvard Law School:
Judge Story was a most voluble talker. He concluded his
remarks about Pinkney by saying, "As great a man as he
was, he had one grievous fault-a fault I advise young men
to guard against-he was an interminable talker." As a
smile flitted across our faces, the Judge broke into a laugh
and added, "It is a great fault no matter who indulges in
it."4
True it is that Justice Scalia's bombarding of counsel during
oral argument grates on his colleagues. Others have documented
the fact:
On a bench lined with solemn gray figures who often sat as
silently as pigeons on a railing, Scalia stood out like a
talking parrot .... Scalia's show did not always play well
with the other justices. Several said they wished he would
be quiet for a change. On occasion, Byron White would
1. John Milton, PARADISE LOST 894, reprinted in GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 318 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1978).
2. 14 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 472 (2d ed. 1989).
3. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989). This lecture extolled the need for hard law, context permitting,
from Aristotle's Politics to Holmes's ill-fated opinion in Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927). Id. There is a lot of Holmes's positivism
in II Giudice Sapiente, as I teach both of them in class.
4. Charles Warren, 2 HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 55 (1908)
(quoting Daniel Saunders of Lawrence, Mass., a student at Harvard Law School
in 1844).
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glare down the bench with a look that suggested he would
like to put the newest justice into a headlock if it would
shut him up. Sandra Day O'Connor would harrumph
slightly when [Scalia] interrupted one of her questions. 5
I know from personal experience that a handshake with Justice
Byron White is crushing, a headlock, God forbid, terminating. Yet
Justice Scalia goes his merry way. "I suppose it's the professor in
me." Indeed.
As to my prediction twenty years ago that Antonin Scalia
would prove a surpassing Supreme Court Justice, he has proved to
be "surpassing" indeed. I have in mind the definition found in
Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language:
"1. To pass or go beyond or over; to surmount. Now rare. Nor
let the sea surpass his bounds. Milton."
6
Twenty years in retrospect show Antonin Scalia a sea crashing
over the Court, condemning his colleagues for surpassing the
bounds of the Constitution.7 "I am chained, because of my theory
of the Constitution," to what each provision meant to those who
5. Christopher E. Smith, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE SUPREME
COURT'S CONSERVATIVE MOMENT 72 (1993) (quoting David G. Savage,
TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST COURT 119 (1992)).
6. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 2539 (2d ed. 1940). Justice Scalia is fond of dictionaries, as is any
follower of Bartolus. My favorite is Holmes's old stand-by, The Century. In his
dissenting opinion in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 864 (1990), for example,
Justice Scalia recites Noah Webster's definition of the noun "witness"---"in
1791 as today." For good measure, Scalia adds: "See also J. Buchanan, Linguae
Britannicae Vera Pronunciato (1757)." Id. For a listing of citations to "Cases in
Which Justice Scalia Has Cited Dictionaries"--four pages of ten-point type--,
see Ralph A. Rossum, ANTONIN SCALIA'S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND
TRADITION app. at 209-12 (2006).
7. Scalia's dissent in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631-32 (1992), is a
paradigm:
In holding that the Establishment Clause prohibits invocations and
benedictions at public school graduation ceremonies, the Court-with
nary a mention that it is doing so-lays waste to a tradition that is as
old as public school graduation ceremonies themselves, and that is a
component of an even more longstanding American tradition of
nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations generally. As its
instrument of destruction, the bulldozer of its social engineering, the
Court invents a boundless, and boundlessly manipulable, test of
psychological coercion .... Today's opinion shows more forcefully
than volumes of argumentation why our Nation's protection, that
fortress which is our Constitution, cannot possibly rest upon the
changeable philosophical predilections of the Justices of this Court, but
must have deep foundations in the historic practices of our people.
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adopted and ratified the Constitution.8 Scalia remains a friendly
knife-fighter; vociferous; argumentative; hard-boiled; Sicilian.
Often he is on fire: "In my view the Customs Service rules are a
kind of immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic
opposition to drug use." His opinions show a good Sabinian of
the school of restraint.' 0 He reminds me of Gaius: "Of rules which
he disapproves he speaks his mind much more strongly, perhaps,
than is customary among jurists.''l" Like Gaius, Scaliaus speaks of
particular rules as "absurd."' 12 Vide his eruption, Mt. Etna if you
will, in the partial-birth abortion case of Stenberg v. Carhart: "The
notion that the Constitution of the United States, designed, among
other things, 'to establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,...
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,'
prohibits the States from simply banning this visibly brutal means
of eliminating our half-born posterity is quite simply absurd.' 3
8. Rossum, supra note 6, at 164 (quoting Justice Scalia's remarks during a
debate with Justice Breyer at American University School of Law, January
2005). Professor Rossum's book is a skilled and admiring commentary that all
"New Justinians" will enjoy.
9. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. H.F. Jolowicz & Barry Nicholas, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 384 (3d ed. 1972), details the two "schools" of
jurists-the Proculians and the Sabinians. "Pomponius says that Labeo and
Capito (in the time of Augustus) 'first created what may be called two sects,'
and that whereas Labeo was a very able man, learned in many branches of
knowledge and an innovator in law, Capito held fast by traditional doctrines."
Id. at 378. On the matter of capital punishment, Justice Scalia follows Capito,
holding fast to the tradition of the death penalty in the United States. See
Scalia's knife-fighting of Justice Souter's dissent in Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct.
2516, 2529 (2006). The dissent finds Kansas's "equipoise rule," which imposes
the death penalty in the event the jury finds the balance of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances in equipoise, violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at
2541. Scalia stabs Souter's dissent, over and over, both empirically and
philosophically. "[T]hose ideologically driven to ferret out and proclaim a
mistaken modem execution have not a single verifiable case to point to, whereas
it is easy as pie to identify plainly guilty murderers who have been set free." Id.
at 2539 (Scalia, J., concurring). Capito Scalia concludes:
The American people have determined that the good to be derived from
capital punishment--in deterrence, and perhaps most of all in the
meting out of condign justice for horrible crimes-outweighs the risk
of error. It is no proper part of the business of this Court, or of its
Justices, to second-guess that judgment, much less to impugn it before
the world, and less still to frustrate it by imposing judicially invented
obstacles to its execution.
Id.
11. William Seagle, MEN OF LAW 62 (1947).
12. Id.
13. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The reader will recall Senator Pastore's measure of expected
performance from Italian American judges: "The Italian American
judge to be considered equal must be twice as good as the next
judge." This links performance to race. I1 Giudice Scalia would
dissent, loudly. "This is absurd." "Mortadella!" In the late
Michigan Law School case, Justice Scalia satirized Michigan's
minority admissions program. If the supposed benefits of diversity
are as compelling as the Michigan Law School claims, it should
lower its admissions standards and give up its desire to have "a
super-duper law school."' 4  A generation ago, Professor Scalia
railed against The Disease As Cure, and ridiculed Justice Powell's
lonely Bakke opinion:
[I]t is increasingly difficult to pretend to one's students that
the decisions of the Supreme Court are tied together by
threads of logic and analysis--as opposed to what seems to
be the fact that the decisions of each of the Justices on the
Court are tied together by threads of social preference and
predisposition. 15
To repeat the point, this is Justinian's insistence on avoidance
of judicial caprice-"cases [being] disposed of rather according to
the will of the judge than by the authority of law." 16 But recall
Ulpian: "[The] derivation [of jus] is from justitia. For, in terms
Celsus' elegant definition, the law is the art of goodness and
fairness."'17 A second birthright, according to Justinian's Digest,
makes judges "[o]f that art ... deservedly called the priests. For
[the priests] cultivate the virtue of justice .. . and affecting a
philosophy which, if I am not deceived, is genuine, not a sham.
' s
Justice Powell, I am sure, sought to cultivate justice by his
Bakke opinion. His is the soft voice of judicial balance, of
moderation.' 9 Justice Scalia's voice is the categorical roar of an
angry lion. "The Constitution proscribes government
discrimination on the basis of race, and state-provided education is
no exception., 20 After Grutter, Justice Powell's voice is the law of
14. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003) (No. 241).
15. Antonin Scalia, The Disease As Cure, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 147
(1979).
16. Second Preface to DIG. 17 (S.P. Scott, 2 THE CIVIL LAW 195 (1932)).
17. DIG. 1.1.1 (Ulpian, INSTITUTES 1).18. Id. at 1111
19. See Paul R. Baier, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 1907-1998: Remembrances
from LSU Law, 59 LA. L. REV. 409 (1999).
20. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the land.21 As at Rome, there are two schools at work on the
Court. Twenty years have emphasized the fact to me. In turn, I
emphasize it to my students. We hear competing voices in class.
At Siena, Italy, Justice Scalia taught "Separation of Powers and
the Rule of Law" for Tulane Law School's summer program. I
tagged along--this was 1991--to compile our teaching materials
and to grade the exams. Our classes met in the camera columna of
Siena University. Morrison v. Olson2 2 was part of the feast. The
reader will recall Justice Scalia's "lonesome dissent" 2 -all alone,
but never nonplused--over the Court's sustaining the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978:
The ad hoc approach to constitutional adjudication has real
attraction, even apart from its work-saving potential. It is
guaranteed to produce a result, in every case, that will make
a majority of the Court happy with the law. The law is, by
definition, precisely what the majority thinks, taking all
things into account, it ought to be. I prefer to rely upon the
judgment of the wise men who constructed our system, and
of the people who approved it, and of two centuries of
history that have shown it to be sound.24
Scalia of Siena reminds me of Bartolus of Sassoferrato:
"Bartolus always frankly expressed his views on the laws on which
he was lecturing. He expressed admiration for useful laws,
condemnation for poor or ill-conceived legislation and scorn for
opinions which he considered foolish. He frequently used the
expression: 'Sed Truffa est' (but this is nonsense). 25
Mistretta v. United States26 was another of our Siena offerings
in which Justice Harry A. Blackmun sustained the constitutionality
of the United States Sentencing Commission. "I think the Court
errs," said Scalia, "because it fails to recognize that this case is not
about commingling, but about the creation of a new Branch
21. Paul R. Baier, Of Bakke's Balance, Gratz and Grutter: The Voice of
Justice Powell, 78 TUL. L. REv. 1955, 1956-57 (2004) ("Bakke's balance, if I
may catch Justice Powell's contribution in a word, mediates between the
strident, self-assured voice that insists our Constitution is color-blind and the
softer, moderate voice that allows a law school to take race into account in
composing itself and in staking out its mission.").
22. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
23. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849,
851 (1989) ("my lonesome dissent").
24. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. Augusto P. Miceli, Bartolus of Sassoferrato, 37 LA. L. REV. 1027, 1034
(1977).
26. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
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altogether, a sort of junior-varsity Congress.' '27 Chief Judge
Stephen Breyer, as he then was, attended our Siena classes. He
served on the United States Sentencing Commission and thought it
constitutional. I sat in silence as these two doctors of law clashed
over our students' heads. "And in the long run," warned II Giudice
Sapiente, "the improvisation of a constitutional structure on the
basis of currently perceived utility will be disastrous., 28  Lately,
Justice Stephen Breyer, as he now is, and Justice Scalia clashed
anew over the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as surgically
reconstructed in United States v. Booker.
29
Another philosopher of the Constitution joined us at Siena. I
am convinced that Justice Hugo L. Black's faith lives on in the
breast of II Giudice Sapiente. "[I]t is language and history that are
the crucial factors which influence me in interpreting the
Constitution," says Justice Black in his treasured little book, A
Constitutional Faith.30  "The courts are given the power to
interpret the Constitution and laws, which means to explain and
expound, not to alter, amend, or remake. Judges take an oath to
support the Constitution as it is, not as they think it should be."
31
"Oh, I like Justice Black," Scalia instructed me as I composed
our teaching materials. "Substantive due process" is a
contradiction in terms--an "oxymoron."32  Neither Black nor
Scalia would allow judges to invent rights out of this vagary. Both
share the restraining philosophy of Plato: "It is the Laws which
govern--not the philosophical Artists of King-Craft., 33 Both stand
27. Id. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. Id.
29. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
30. Hugo L. Black, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1968) (revised version of
three lectures delivered at Columbia University Law School by Justice Black in
the James S. Carpentier Series, March 1968).
31. Id. at20-21.
32. "Consistent with his text-and-tradition approach, Scalia rejects
substantive due process, rightly calling it an 'oxymoron'; it is ... nothing more
than "each Justice's subjective assessment of what is fair and just."" Rossum,
supra note 6, at 167 (footnote omitted).
33. George Grote, 3 PLATO AND OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOCRATES 310
(1865). I am quoting from Hugo Black's personal copy of Grote's Plato, which
includes Justice Black's hand-written index, his notes, his underscorings on the
end papers of the book, e.g.: "LAWS-Not MEN provided for Government in
DeLegibus ... . 'Fixed laws'-Judges & magistrates must be servants of the law
310 ...." Accord Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (Scalia, J.)
("[T]o say and mean that, is to replace judges of the law with a committee of
philosopher-kings.").
Grote's Plato, Aristotle's Treatise on Rhetoric, Montesquieu's The Spirit of
the Laws, and many other of Hugo Black's personal books fell into my hands
during my year as a Judicial Fellow at the Supreme Court. I would spend
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with Aristotle: "It would then be most admirably adapted to the
purposes of justice, if laws properly enacted were, as far as
circumstances admitted, of themselves to mark out all cases and to
abandon as few as possible to the discretion of the judge."' Y4 Both
echo Justinian-De Officio Judicis.35  They champion
Montes uieu: "Fixed laws" to prevent "capricious will or arbitrary
power."6 They follow Bentham: "But let a judge dare to arrogate
to himself the power of interpreting the laws, that is to say, of
substituting his will for that of the legislator, and everything
becomes arbitrary; no one can foresee the course which caprice
will take.""'
Justice Black cited Justinian when he condemned trying people
twice for the same conduct.38 Justice Scalia invoked the ancient
Greeks in condemning the conviction of a man for murder that was
not murder (only manslaughter) when the offense was committed.
"Nulla poena sine lege," exclaimed Scalia in his dissent in Rogers
Saturdays in the Hugo Black Reading Room exploring Justice Black's
marginalia, "gloss," as the Civilians say. A man's books are a roadmap to his
mind.
34. Aristotle, TREATISE ON RHETORIC 4 (Theodore Buckley trans., 1853).
Hugo Black underscored this passage in his personal copy of the book. Earl
Warren, who had never judged a day in his life and came to the Court as Chief
Justice, asked Hugo Black to recommend some reading to help him with his newjob. Justice Black recommended Aristotle's Rhetoric. Let not the sea surpass
his bounds. "I stand with Aristotle, then-which is a pretty good place to
stand," says Scalia. Scalia, supra note 3, at 1182.
35. De officio judicis in genere: "It remains, that we inquire into the office
and duty of a judge: whose first care it ought to be not to determine otherwise,
than the laws, the constitutions, or the customs and usages direct." J. INST. 4.8
(Thomas Cooper ed., Dr. Harris trans., 1812).
36. Baron de Montesquieu, 1 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 150 (Thomas Nugent
trans., 1899) (Hugo Black's indexing note, end papers, in his personal copy).
"But constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to
abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go. Is it not strange, though
true, to say that virtue itself has need of limits?" Id. (underscored boldly by
Hugo Black).
37. Jeremy Bentham, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 155 (1911). The quoted
passage is underscored in Justice Black's personal copy of the book; page 155
contains Justice Black's marginal note, in his bold handwriting: "Judicial
usurpation."
38. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 151-52 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)
("Fear and abhorrence of governmental power to try people twice for the same
conduct is one of the oldest ideas found in western civilization. Its roots run
deep into Greek and Roman times."). Justice Black cites Justinian's Digest:
"The Governor should not permit the same person to be again accused of crime
of which he has been acquitted." Id. at 152 n.3 (quoting Dig. 48.2.7.2 (S.P.
Scott, 11 THE CIvIL LAW 17)).
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v. Tennessee.39 Hugo Black would join it. I commend this dissent
as pure Scalia-"surpassing" in Noah Webster's second sense: "2.
To be better, greater, stronger, etc., than; to be superior to in
quality, degree, performance, etc.; to exceed; as ... he surpassed
all his contemporaries in skill.
'A4
At Siena, our "New Justinians ''4 confronted Coy v. Iowa.
42
This is Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court holding that the Sixth
Amendment prohibits putting a screen between an alleged sexual
assailant and his two thirteen-year-old girl accusers.43 The right of
confrontation "existed under Roman law," Scalia taught. "Simply
as a mater of Latin as well, since the word 'confront' ultimately
derives from the prefix 'con-' (from 'contra' meaning 'against' or
'opposed') and the noun 'frons' (forehead)." 44
Side-by-side Scalia of Siena, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
turned her back to the Confrontation Clause in Maryland v. Craig,
rejecting any absolute right to a face-to-face confrontation and
allowing a child witness in a child abuse case to testify outside the
defendant's presence by one-way closed circuit television a.4  The
reader, I am sure, knows what to expect from our Siena Doctor of
Law. "Because the text of the Sixth Amendment is clear, and
because the Constitution is meant to protect against, rather than
conform to, current 'widespread belief,' I respectfully dissent.
'A6
Justice Hugo Black assuredly lives on at the Court:
For good or bad, the Sixth Amendment requires
confrontation, and we are not at liberty to ignore it. To
quote from the document one last time (for it plainly says
all that need be said): "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him" (emphasis added).47
39. 532 U.S. 451,.467 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40. WEBSTER'S, supra note 6, at 2539. Of course, as I said elsewhere,
judicial evaluation, whether of one opinion or twenty years in retrospect,
"necessarily depends on one's philosophy of performance." Paul R. Baier, The
Court and Its Critics, 78 A.B.A.J. 59, 59 (1992).
41. This is how Justinian wanted students in the first-year of their legal
studies to be known. "[T]hey are to be known as 'New Justinians."' DIG.,
supra note 17, at li.
42. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
43. Id. at 1021.
44. Id. at 1016.
45. 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990) (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 861 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 870.
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Both Justice Black and Justice Scalia are champions of the Bill
of Rights, without any ifs, ands, or buts.48 Justice Scalia's heated
dissent in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,49 against Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion for the Court sustaining the detention of an
alleged "enemy combatant" in President Bush's "war on terror,"
was of a piece with Hugo Black's insistence that the Constitution
controls the military. 50 Absent a congressional suspension of the
writ of habeas corpus, "a citizen held where the courts are open is
entitled either to criminal trial or to a judicial decree requiring his
release."51
Enforcing the Bill of Rights is one thing. Adding to it is quite
another.52 The other day Justice Scalia identified himself with
Justice Black's attack upon the Court for adding "supposedly
'constitutional' prophylactic rules to what the Constitution itself
requires. 53 This was in our Bartolus's burning dissent in Dickerson
v. United States, where Scalia condemns the Court for "imposing
what it regards as useful 'prophylactic' restrictions upon Congress
and the States,"54 beyond the Constitution's bounds. "That is an
immense and frightening anti-democratic power, and it does not
48. In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2563 (2006),
Justice Scalia for the Court reversed a criminal conviction where the trial court,
in violation of the Sixth Amendment, denied the accused counsel of his choice.
"Oh, but the trial was fair and the accused had substitute counsel," says the
Government. Id. at 2561-62. Nothing doing, says Scalia, J.: "In sum, the right
at stake here is the right to counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that
right was violated because the deprivation of counsel was erroneous. No
additional showing of prejudice is required to make the violation 'complete."'
Id. at 2562 (footnote omitted).
49. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
50. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (on rehearing).
51. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 572. Justice Scalia's dissent relies on Justice
Black's plurality opinion in Reid, 354 U.S. at 30 ("Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2
(1866), remains 'one of the great landmarks in this Court's history."').
52. See, e.g., Justice Scalia's refusal for the Court in McNeil v. Wisconsin,
501 U.S. 171 (1991), to add a third layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to
counsel. He quotes Mr. Justice Jackson's sage admonition, in Douglas v.
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943): "This Court is forever adding new stories
to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing
when one story too many is added." I know from personal observation that this
is a favorite apergus of Justice Scalia. Similarly, in his opinion for the Court in
Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006), Justice Scalia refuses to extend the
Mapp exclusionary rule to a violation of the "knock and announce" rule.
"Resort to the massive remedy of suppressing evidence of guilt is unjustified."
Id. at 2168.
53. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 741 (1969) (Black, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. 530 U.S. 428, 446 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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exist."55  "[I]t is simply no longer possible for the Court to
conclude, even if it wanted to, that a violation of Miranda's rules is
a violation of the Constitution. 56 The Court, said our Gaius, is
acting as a "nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs-up or thumbs-
down to whatever outcome, case by case, suits or offends its
collective fancy.",57 Let not the sea surpass his bounds.
Justice Black's dissent in Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, against Justice Douglas's egalitarian reading of the
Equal Protection Clause,58 anticipated Justice Scalia's dissent
against Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion, which opened the
doors of the Virginia Military Institute to women. 59 The virtue of a
democratic system is that Virginia is free to change its law. "That
system is destroyed if the smug assurances of each age are
removed from the democratic process and written into the
Constitution. ' 60  The Court is "most illiberal . . . inscribing one
after the other of the current preferences of the society (and in
some cases only the countermajoritarian preferences of the
society's law-trained elite) into our Basic Law." 61 The history and
the long tradition, enduring down to the present, of all-male
military colleges supported by both the states and the federal
government, count for nothing. "Since it is entirely clear that the
Constitution of the United States--the old one--4akes no sides in
this educational debate, I dissent."
62
55. Id.
56. Id. at 454.
57. Id. at 455.
58. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding Virginia's $1.50 annual poll tax a
violation of equal protection). Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court reads the
Equal Protection Clause through "le sens jvolutif':
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we
have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than
we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a
given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights. Notions of
what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause do change.
Id. at 669.
Said Justice Black, dissenting:
[W]hen a "political theory" embodied in our Constitution becomes
outdated, it seems to me that a majority of the nine members of this
Court are not only without constitutional power but are far less
qualified to choose a new constitutional political theory than the people
of this country proceeding in the manner provided by Article V.
Id. at 678.
59. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
60. Id. at 567 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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And what of fundamental rights jurisprudence? Scalia
condemns Roe v. Wade63 -"Sed Truffa est.' '64 Justice O'Connor's
view in another abortion case "cannot be taken seriously., 65 "I
continue to dissent from this enterprise of devising an Abortion
Code, and from the illusion that we have authority to do so."' 66 The
Constitution "contains no right to abortion. It is not found in the
longstanding traditions of our society, nor can it be logically
deduced from the text of the Constitution, 67 insists Justice Scalia.
And then there is Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, June 29, 1992, the joint opinion of
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, saving Roe v. Wade. I
was teaching at Aix en Provence, France, awaiting Justice Harry
A. Blackmun's arrival. He brought the Casey slip opinions to class
and taught a competing view of liberty: "That tradition is a living
thing." Not so at all, "Sed Truffa est," according to Justice
Scalia's surpassing dissent: "We should get out of this area, where
we have no right to be, and where we do neither ourselves nor the
country any good by remaining., 70 The reader will sense the clash
of Proculians and Sabinians in the contemporary corridors of Siena
or aside the mossy fountains of Aix.
63. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Nor does the Constitution say anything about a
supposed "right to die with dignity":
[T]he point at which life becomes "worthless," and the point at which
the means necessary to preserve it become "extraordinary" or
"inappropriate," are neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to
the nine Justices of this Court any better than they are known to nine
people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
64. "But this is nonsense." Miceli, supra note 25, at 1034.
65. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
66. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 480 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
67. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
68. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
69. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1992) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting
from dismissal on jurisdictional grounds)).
70. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 1002 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
512 [Vol. 67
JUSTINIAN AND SCALIA
Justice Scalia derides the idea of a "Living Constitution." 7 1
His Tanner Lectures at Princeton address the neglect "of the
science of construing legal texts." 72 Scalia insists on interpreting
the Constitution according to the original meaning, not the current
meaning, of its texts. 73 "I favour an approach called originalism,
the basic tenets of which are twofold: (1) adhere to text; and (2)
give text the meaning it bore when it was adopted. 74 According
to Justice Scalia, his theory of interpretation is the lesser evil.
"[T]he originalist at least knows what he is looking for: the
original meaning of the text." 75  At the end of A Matter of
Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law,76 Justice Scalia's
teaching echoes Justinian's instructions to professors of law and to
judges--they must limit themselves within the bounds of the
Corpus Juris.77 There is no room to roam at large: "The American
people have been converted to belief in The Living Constitution, a
'morphing' document that means, from age to age, what it ought to
mean. 78
The consequences are dire, according to II Giudice Scalia:
If the courts are free to write the Constitution anew, they
will, by God, write it the way the majority wants; the
appointment and confirmation process will see to that.
This, of course, is the end of the Bill of Rights, whose
meaning will be committed to the very body it was meant
to protect against: the majority. By trying to make the
Constitution do everything that needs doing from age to
age, we shall have caused it to do nothing at all.79
71. Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 44-45 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) ("Perhaps the most glaring defect of
Living Constitutionalism, next to its incompatibility with the whole
antievolutionary purpose of a constitution, is that there is no agreement, and no
chance of agreement, upon what is to be the guiding principle of the
evolution.").
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id. at 38.
74. Antonin Scalia, Romancing the Constitution: Interpretation As
Invention, 23 SUP. CT. L. REv. (2d) 337, 337 (2004).
75. Scalia, supra note 71, at 45.
76. Id. at 47.
77. See DIG., supra note 17, at xlviii-xlix:
No skilled lawyers are to presume in the future to supply commentaries
thereon and confuse with their own verbosity the brevity of the
aforesaid work, in the way that was done in former times, when by the
conflicting opinions of expositors the whole of the law was virtually
thrown into confusion.
78. Scalia, supra note 71, at 47.
79. Id.
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As I said twenty years ago, the debate over how judges should
exercise their power is ageless. Justice Scalia's originalism is akin
to Justice Black's textualism. Hugo Black objected vociferously to
judges "keeping the Constitution in tune with the times."8 °  So
does Scalia.
Of course, it pains Justice Scalia to see the Court surpassing its
bounds. But, truth to tell, the Court has never bound itself to text
or to original meanini. Life after text frees the judge. La vie aprbs
le texte libbre lejuge. 1
I have in mind a walk Scalia and I took after class in Siena to
see the Catedrale di Santa Maria (the "Duomo"). 82  I mentioned
Chief Justice Hughes's interpretation for the Court in Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,83 apropos the Contracts
80. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting):
I realize that many good and able men have eloquently spoken and
written, sometimes in rhapsodical strains, about the duty of this Court
to keep the Constitution in tune with the times. The idea is that the
Constitution must be changed from time to time and that this Court is
charged with a duty to make those changes. For myself, I must with all
deference reject that philosophy. The Constitution makers knew the
need for change and provided for it. Amendments suggested by the
people's elected representatives can be submitted to the people or their
selected agents for ratification. That method of change was good for
our Fathers, and being somewhat old-fashioned I must add it is good
enough for me.
81. L. Vita praeter textus iudicem libeat. It. La vita dopo il testo libera il
giudice. Sp. La vida despues del texto libera aljuez. G. Leben nach dem Text
befreit den Richter.
Cf Alain Levasseur, Code Napolean or Code Portalis?, 43 TUL. L. REv. 762,
773 (1969) (Portalis's insight, apropos the Projet of France's Code Civil: "The
Codes of nations are the fruit of the passage of time; but properly speaking, we
do not make them."). One hundred years after the Code Civil, Frangois G~ny's
Mgthode d'Interpretation trumpets life after text:
One has tried to replace the syllogistic and dogmatic method, which
deduced from the codes a completely fictitious and unreal "life"
incapable of development and fixed definitely at the moment the
logical construction was completed, by a method tied to organic life or
to historical development, a method which is external rather than only
internal as the first was, and the characteristic of which is the constant
revival of the codes, not by their own substance, but through the
introduction of all the elements of dynamic life itself
Raymond Saleilles, Preface to Frangois Gdny, METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET
SOURCES EN DRorr PRIv POSrIF LXXXI (Jaro Mayda trans., La. State Law
Inst. 1963) (1899).
82. The "Duomo" overwhelms any talk of law, see http://europe
forvisitors.com/europe/galleries/italy/blg-it-sienaduomofacade_ blue sky.htm
(last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
83. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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Clause. I paraphrased Hughes in Siena. I quote the Hughes Court
here exactly:
If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the
time of its adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say
that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined
to the interpretation of the framers, with the conditions and
outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the
statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard against
such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall
uttered the memorable warning: "We must never forget that
it is a constitution we are expounding" (McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407, 4 L. Ed. 579); "a constitution
intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to
be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." Id.,
page 415 of 4 Wheat. 4
As I remember it, Scalia took me and Hughes to task. Those
who imply from Marshall's utterance that the Constitution must
change from age to age are mistaken--"But that is a canard., 85
"Sed Truffa est."
Cardozo taught differently in his day: "No one shall be deprived
of liberty without due process of law. Here is a concept of the
greatest generality," says Cardozo in his immortal classic, The
Nature of the Judicial Process.8 6 "Yet it is put before the courts en
bloc. Liberty is not defined. Its limits are not mapped and charted.
How shall they be known?"87 Cardozo's answer is to see the notion
of modem liberty as a "fluid and dynamic conception," which "must
also underlie the cognate notion of equality." 8 "From all of this, it
results that the content of constitutional immunities is not constant,
but varies from age to age." 89
84. Id. at 442-43.
85. Scalia, supra note 23, at 853. Justice Scalia prefers Justice Black's
interpretation of Marshall's line: "We conclude as we do because we remember
that it is a Constitution and that it is our duty 'to bow with respectful submission to
its provisions."' Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 341 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 377 (1821)). "Or as Felix Frankfurter
put it more concisely: 'Precisely because "it is a constitution we are expounding,"
we ought not to take liberties with it."' Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of
Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 581, 596 (1989) (quoting
Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 647 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
86. Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 76
(1921).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 81-82.
89. Id. at 82-83.
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Good teaching requires a clash of views. At Siena, Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr. also obtruded into our classroom, his
contribution to the science of construing legal texts: The
Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification.9 °
If I may obtrude myself, let me add an insight of my own to
this retrospective on text, tradition, and teaching. Let us leave
Siena and return to Aix en Provence, where Portalis--e Pare du
Code Civil (the Father of the Civil Code)-played as a little boy on
the Cours Mirabeau. Justice Blackmun joined us "to talk anew of
the timeless problem of judicial interpretation of written texts,
from Napoleon's Code to America's Constitution." 91 The theme of
our teaching, the subtitle of our course on constitutional
interpretation, was drawn from a little book by a great French law
teacher and jurist. The book is Frangois Grny's Les Procd~s
d'Elaboration du Droit Civil, a lecture delivered by Gdny at Nancy
in 1910. At the end of his book, Grny emphasizes the role, which
he suggests was neglected by theoreticians of his time, "des
procid~s intellectuels et de la terminologie dans l' laboration
juridique," the role "of the intellectual process and of the
terminology in juridical elaboration." 92 As we taught at Aix, there
is more than a rough connection between the methods suggested by
Grny and other continental thinkers for interpreting their codes and
our own workways in interpreting the American Constitution.
93
Cardozo saw the link between code and Constitution in terms
of juridical technique:
The same problems of method, the same contrasts
between the letter and spirit, are living problems in our own
land and law. Above all, in the field of constitutional law,
the method of free decision has become, I think, the
dominant one today. The great generalities of the
Constitution have a content and a significance that vary
from age to age. The method of free decision sees through
90. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, Address to the Georgetown University Text &
Teaching Symposium (Oct. 12, 1985), in 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 2 (1985).
91. Harry A. Blackmun & Paul R. Baier, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
PROCtDES D'ELABORATION vi (June/July 1992) (teaching materials for a summer
course on American Constitutional Law at Aix en Provence, France) (on file with
LSU Law Center Library).
92. Id. at v.
93. Harvard Law School Professor and comparativist Mary Ann Glendon
voiced the same idea in her commentary on Justice Scalia's Tanner Lectures at
Princeton, see Scalia, supra note 71, at 103-06.
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the transitory particulars and reaches what is permanent
behind them.
Like Napoleon's Code, America's Constitution is seen as a
living document. 95 Portalis puts it this way: "The Codes of nations
are the fruit of the passage of time; but properly speaking, we do
not make them."96 "Par le Code civil, mais au-dela du Code civil"
("Through the Civil Code; but beyond the Civil Code").97 Judges
of Cardozo's school are entrusted to interpret code or Constitution
through "le sens evolutif' 98 Our Siena interloper, Justice Breyer,
espouses Active Liberty.99 Breyer's book, let me say, is a nice foil
to Scalia's A Matter of Interpretation.
To repeat my own idea: Life after text frees the judge. Au-delhi
de la Constitution, mais par la Constitution.
Once more: There are two schools at work at the Court.
Bowers v. Hardwick, of twenty years ago, has been overruled.' 00
94. Cardozo, supra note 86, at 17. Justice Blackmun quoted Cardozo's
thought, "The great generalities of the constitution have a content and a
significance that vary from age to age," in his Bakke opinion. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (citation omitted). "Of course,
times are different in 1970 than they were 200 years ago. No body of men 200
years ago could determine what our problems are today. That is, I suppose, what
we have courts for, to construe the Constitution in the light of current problems."
The Nomination of Harry A. Blackmun, of Minnesota, to Be Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the Untied States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong. 35 (1970), reprinted in Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron
Jacobstein, 8 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND
REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL & UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1916-1972, at 35 (1975).
95. See generally Paul R. Baier, Mr. Justice Blackmun: Reflections from the
Cours Mirabeau, 43 AM. UNIV. L. REv. 707 (1994).
96. The Preliminary Discourse of Portalis (Shael Herman, trans.), quoted in
Levasseur, supra note 81, at 763.
97. "I could not end with better words than those inspired by an analogous
phrase of Jhering, which is the focal point of the whole book of Mr. G6ny:
'Through the Civil Code; but beyond the Civil Code."' Saleilles, supra note 81, at
LXXXVI. All of which is detailed masterfully in Colonel John H. Tucker, Jr., Au-
Dek du Code Civil, Mais Par le Code Civil, 34 LA. L. REv. 957 (1974).
98. "The President of the highest French Court, M. Ballot-Beaupr6,
explained, a few years ago, that the provisions of the Napoleonic legislation had
been adapted to modem conditions by a judicial interpretation in 'le sens
evolutif."' Cardozo, supra note 86, at 84 (quoting Munroe Smith, JURISPRUDENCE
29-30 (1909)).
99. Stephen Breyer, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 5-6 (2005) ("My thesis... finds in the Constitution's democratic
objective not simply restraint on judicial power or an ancient counterpart of more
modem protection, but also a source of judicial authority and an interpretative aid
to more effective protection of ancient and modem liberty alike.").
100. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Anthony Kennedy, J.).
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Lawrence v. Texas, to my eye, reads the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of liberty through "le sens 4volutif':
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment
known the components of liberty in its manifold
possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did
not presume to have this insight. They knew times can
blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only
to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for
greater freedom. 101
All of this, of course, is foreign nonsense to the Scalianistae.
"We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States
of America that we are expounding."'0 2 Expounding the United
States Constitution, II Giudice Sapiente exclaimed in his Lawrence
dissent:
What Texas has chosen to do is well within the range of
democratic action, and its hand should not be stayed
through the invention of a brand-new "constitutional right"
by a Court that is impatient of democratic change. It is
indeed true that "later generations can see that laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress,"
and when that happens, later generations can repeal those
laws. But it is the premise of our system that those
judgments are to be made by the people, and not imposed
by a governing caste that knows best.l13
The reader will recall Justinian's warning to his professors of
law, Theophilus, Dorotheus, Isodorus, Anatolius, and Salaminius,
to mention a majority of five, at the outset of the Digest. They are
to teach the truth of the Corpus Juris. They are forbidden to reach
beyond it:
101. Id at 578-79.
102. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). A plurality of the Court, per Stevens, J., citing the law of foreign
nations, held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of persons under
the age of fifteen at the time of the offense. Id. at 838. Justices Scalia and Breyer
continue this debate on television in A Conversation on the Relevance of Foreign
Law for the American Constitutional Adjudication (C-SPAN television broadcast
Jan. 13, 2001) (on file with LSU Law Center Media Library).
103. 539 U.S. at 603-04 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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We say this because we have heard that even in the most
splendid civitas of Alexandria and in that of Caesarea and
others there are unqualified men who take an unauthorized
course and impart a spurious erudition to their pupils; we
warn them off these endeavors, under the threat that... they
are to be punished by a fine of ten pounds of gold and be
driven from the civitas in which they commit a crime against
the law instead of teaching it.
104
The Court's "death-is-different" Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence 10 5 irritates Justice Scalia. The Supreme Court, we are
advised, has surpassed its bounds. Hamilton's No. 78 insists that
courts "should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which
serve to define and point out their duty in every particular case that
comes before them."'10 6  Yet in Roper v. Simmons, the Court
unbounded itself to hold that the Eighth Amendment forbids the
death penalty for a seventeen-year-old who bound and gagged a
woman with duct tape, tied her hands and feet together with
electrical wire, and threw her from a bridge above the Meramec
River, drowning her in the waters below. 10 7 Roars our lion-hearted
friend Justice Scalia-jaws wide open:
Bound down, indeed. What a mockery today's opinion
makes of Hamilton's expectation, announcing the Court's
conclusion that the meaning of our Constitution has changed
over the past 15 years--not, mind you, that this Court's
decision 15 years ago was wrong, but that the Constitution
has changed .... Worse still, the Court says in so many
words that what our people's laws say about the issue does
not, in the last analysis, matter: "[I]n the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment." The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of
our Nation's moral standards---and in the course of
104. DIG., supra note 17, at liii.
105. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
106. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 298 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. & A. McLean
ed., 1788). This is the original edition, which I found by way of a Sunday flea-
market outing in the Virginia countryside during my year as a Judicial Fellow at
the Supreme Court. I paid a dollar for it. When I showed this treasure to Chief
Justice Burger, he said to me, "Paul, how would you like to double your money?"
I took it with me to Siena, with Scalia in class. Although it is not signed by
Alexander Hamilton, it is signed by "Antonin Scalia July 4, 1991, Siena, Italy." A
double treasure.
107. 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
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discharging that awesome responsibility purports to take
guidance from the views of foreign courts and legislatures.
Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth
Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions
of our Constitution, should be determined by the subjective
views of five Members of this Court and like-minded
foreigners, I dissent.10 8
Let me conclude this retrospective by taking you back one
hundred years before Justice Scalia took his seat on the Supreme
Court. The year is 1886, the year of Hugo Black's birth.' ° 9 We are
in a classroom at Harvard College where Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. is addressing undergraduates on "The Profession of the Law."
The law is not the place for the artist or the poet, "The law is the
calling of thinkers."' 1 In a word, twenty years in retrospect show
108. Id. at 608 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). There is a kinship, I
am happy to report to Louisiana's legal community, between Justice Scalia and
Louisiana's Edward Douglass White-born of Thibodaux, Louisiana, 1844,
baptized St. Joseph's Church, Confederate soldier boy, opposite Captain Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., captured at Port Hudson, Chief Justice of the United States,
1910-1921. Those who know Chief Justice White's monumental dissent (Holmesjoined it) in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382-413 (1910), will see the
same constraints being applied by both White and Scalia in construing the Eighth
Amendment-constraints "directly repugnant to the conception that by judicial
construction constitutional limitations may be made to progress so as to ultimately
include that which they were not intended to embrace." Id. at 411. To both of
them, text, history, and tradition bind the judge down from "mere emotional
tendencies." Id. at 385.
On the one hundredth anniversary of Edward Douglass White taking his seat
on the Supreme Court, March 12, 1994, Justice Scalia was an honored guest-I
was his driver--at a Centennial Celebration at White's boyhood home in
Thibodaux. From the front porch of this historic landmark, Justice Scalia told the
assembled citizens and Mayor Alton "Checkerboard" Roundtree: "Our history
makes us who we are. If we forget our history, we've lost a part of ourselves."
Colley Charpentier, Scalia in City to Honor White, DAILY COMET (Thibodaux),
Mar. 14, 1994, at 10A. Of Chief Justice White, Scalia told the Daily Comet, "In
many areas, he and I are alike. He dissented in a case called Weems, and a few
years ago I dissented in a case using the very same argument." Id. Justice Scalia's
words will not lightly fade from the memory of those who heard him remember
Louisiana's great Chief Justice on White's Centennial Day.
109. "Born February 27, 1886, in the middle of Grover Cleveland's first term
as President of the United States, I am today eighty-two years and three months
old." Hugo L. Black, The Memoirs of Hugo L. Black, in MR. JUSTICE AND MRS.
BLACK: THE MEMOIRS OF HUGO L. BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK 3 (Paul R.
Baier ed., 1986).
110. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Profession of the Law, Lecture
Delivered to Undergraduates of Harvard University (Feb. 17, 1886), in Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., SPEECHES 22-23 (1891):
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Antonin Scalia a thinker-just as Holmes, another practitioner
turned professor, and thence to the Court, was a thinker. Let me
affirm also that our friend Nino Scalia is what the Romans knew as
a bonus vir. "I suggest, in other words, that it is by teaching your
students virtue and responsibility-much more than by teaching
them the contents of their I legal 'rights'-you preserve the
foundations of our freedoms.""l
I will end with an excerpt from Joseph Story, the first Harvard
Professor on the Supreme Bench. This from a letter to a friend on
the value of the study of romance languages to the judicial mind:
To be ignorant of these languages is to shut out the lights of
former times. There is not a single language of modem
Europe, in which literature has made any considerable
advances, which is not directly of Roman origin. The
English language abounds with words and meanings drawn
from classical sources. Innumerable expressions have
received their vivid tints from the beautiful dyes of Roman
and Grecian roots.
Who, that mediates over the strains of Milton, does not
perceive in them a discipline of the old school, whose genius
was inflamed by the heroic verse, the terse satire, and the
playful wit of antiquity? Who does not feel that the fires of
his maepificent mind were lighted by coals from ancient
alters? r1
Salve, I1 Giudice Justinianus.
Of course, the law is not the place for the artist or the poet. The law is
the calling of thinkers. But to those who believe with me that not the
least godlike of man's activities is the large survey of causes, that to
know is no less than to feel, I say--and I say no longer with any
doubt--that a man may live greatly in the law as well as elsewhere; that
there as well as elsewhere his thought may find its unity in an infinite
perspective; that there as well as elsewhere he may wreak himself upon
life, may drink the bitter cup of heroism, may wear out his heart after the
unattainable.
111. Antonin Scalia, Teaching About the Law, 8 CHRIsTIAN LEGAL SOC'Y Q.
6, 10 (1987).
112. Quoted in Paul R. Baier, I1 Giudice Sapiente: Antonin Scalia, Remarks to
the Southern Conference of State Bar Presidents Introducing Antonin Scalia as
Keynote Speaker (Sept. 28, 1991), New Orleans, in Paul R. Baier, SPEECHES AND
SELECT LEGAL PAPERS, with a Foreword by Justice Harry A. Blackmun (on file
with author) (citing 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 508-11 (William W.
Story ed., 1851)).
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